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Abstract. Philosophers of religion of the Cracow Circle (1934-1944) are the 
principal precursors of what is now called the analytic philosophy of religion. Th e 
widespread claim that the analytic philosophy of religion was from the beginning 
an Anglo-American aff air is an ill-informed one. It is demonstrable that the 
enterprise, although not the label “analytic philosophy of religion,” appeared in 
Poland in the 1930’s. Józef Bocheński’s post-war work is a development of the 
Cracow Circle’s pre-war work in the analytic philosophy of religion, or at least 
of important elements of that earlier work. Bocheński’s approach in his Logic of 
Religion is quite original and might still be profi tably studied and discussed by 
philosophers of religion of the analytic persuasion.
My ambition here is to present the philosophers of religion of the 
Cracow Circle as the principal precursors of what is now called the 
analytic philosophy of religion and to show that the work of these earlier 
philosophers was further developed by Polish philosophers in an original 
way into the 1970’s, drawing little inspiration from the Anglo-American 
trend that began in the 1950’s. I am struck by the ignorance of this work 
that is displayed in much of the contemporary literature that purports to 
examine the history of this philosophical genre.1 My impression is that 
1 For example: William Hasker, “Analytic Philosophy of Religion” in W. J. Wainwright, 
ed., Th e Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005); Andrew Chignell and Andrew Dole, “Th e Ethics of Religious Belief: A Recent 
History” in Andrew Chignell and Andrew Dole, eds., God and the Ethics of Belief, 
New Essays in Philosophy of Religion, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); 
Nicholas Wolterstorff , “How Philosophical Th eology Became Possible within the Analytic 
Tradition of Philosophy” in O. D. Crisp & M. C. Rea, eds., Analytic Th eology, New Essays 
in the Philosophy of Th eology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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contemporary authors typically start with the ill-informed conviction 
that the analytic philosophy of religion was from the beginning an 
Anglo-American aff air. But in fact it is demonstrable that the enterprise, 
although not the label “analytic philosophy of religion,” appeared in 
Poland in the 1930’s.
Of course, one could say that philosophy of religion done in 
a recognizably analytic style began with Duns Scotus, Aquinas, and 
Anselm—and why not Aristotle? But to say that the analytic philosophy 
of religion began with such thinkers would simply be to use the label 
“analytic philosophy” not to denote an historical trend in the recent 
history of philosophy—the standard usage—but to refer to a way of 
philosophizing that pre-dates the work in logic and the philosophy of 
language of fi gures like Frege, Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein that 
informed analytic philosophy as we speak of it today. I will use the term 
“analytic philosophy” in the ordinary way, as a label for the “logico-
linguistic” style of philosophy that so powerfully exerted itself (especially 
in the English-speaking world, but also in Austria and elsewhere) aft er 
Frege, and, using the term in that way, will maintain that it was in the 
1930’s that the analytic philosophy of religion fi rst appeared: not later, in 
the 1950’s, and not in the English-speaking countries but in Poland, even 
if today’s analytic philosophers of religion are not generally aware of this 
and oft en present another narrative. Th is will occupy the fi rst, historical 
part of this paper.
In the second part of the paper, I will outline and discuss Józef 
Bocheński’s Logic of Religion, a book that was published in English in 
1965. I will present Bocheński’s work as a post-war development of the 
Cracow Circle’s pre-war work in the analytic philosophy of religion, or 
at least of important elements of that earlier work. Th is part of the paper 
is more of an analysis than a history. Viewed from the standpoint of 
Anglo-American analytic philosophy of religion as that has developed, 
Bocheński’s approach in the Logic of Religion is quite original and might 
still (aft er 45 years) be profi tably studied and discussed by philosophers 
of religion of the analytic persuasion. At least, it is my hope to show that 
it could.
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I. THE PHILOSOPHERS OF THE CRACOW CIRCLE 
AS PRECURSORS
OF THE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Precursors of Analytic Philosophy
Th e French philosopher and historian of science, Georges Canguilhem, 
wrote some famous pages (famous at least within the French philosophy 
curriculum) against the notion of a precursor.2 For him, the history of 
science would lose its sense by taking seriously the notion of a precursor—
someone advancing in a certain direction without arriving at the fi nal 
point, with someone else, later, continuing on in the same direction and 
aiming at the same goal. Th e precursor would be “a thinker of many 
times,” someone “extracted from his cultural frame,” Canguilhem 
maintains:3 a fi ction if not an absurdity. Let us suppose that this claim is 
correct about the history of science; I wonder if it would also be correct 
about the history of philosophy. Philosophical conceptions may be 
viewed as realizations of diverse theoretical possibilities within the total 
framework of philosophy, and not only as historical events. Sometimes 
a given theoretical perspective is dominant at one moment, while at 
another moment it is no longer taken seriously. It can even appear to 
have run its course and died permanently. On that account of philosophy, 
a so-called “precursor” is someone who does not belong to the dominant 
philosophical paradigm of his own epoch, but who, in retrospect, seems 
to have begun to mine a theoretical possibility currently dominant.
With the advent of analytic philosophy appeared the possibility 
of exploring the traditional philosophical problems of religion from 
an analytic perspective. But in what did, and does that perspective 
consist? Th e question of defi ning analytic philosophy is, to be sure, an 
international sport in which many compete. Here is my own proposal, 
not very original, that diff erentiates analytic philosophy from the so-
called “Continental tradition.” 
2 Georges Canguilhem, Études d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences, (Paris : Vrin, 
1994), Introduction. 
3 Ibid., p. 21. 
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Analytic philosophy favors: 
1. Argumentation
2. A direct treatment of problems
3. Clarity, precision, and specifi city
4. Literality
5. An alethic project in philosophy.
Continental philosophy favors: 
A. “Visions” 
B. An oblique and historical treatment of problems
C. Depth, breadth, and global perspectives 
D. Metaphor and stylistic fl ourishes
E. An interpretative project in philosophy. 
While favoring the analytic style in my own work, I make no judgments 
here; I am not saying that 1-5 are good and A-E bad. Th ese are diff erences 
of objectives and ambitions. It is of course possible to make evaluative 
judgments concerning these various points of contrast, but one does 
not have to go so far as to say, for example, that literality is good and 
metaphor bad, or the reverse, or even that the kind of clarity given by 
logical analysis is a panacea in philosophy, or that depth is an obvious 
requirement. What matters here is rather the recognition that the 
objectives and ambitions are not the same on the two sides, even if there 
is some overlap and some neutral territory.
What is specifi cally important for my discussion in this section is 
just that analytic philosophy, from its very beginning, presented the 
possibility of a philosophy of religion incorporating the objectives and 
ambitions of the analytic approach.4 Histories of the analytic philosophy 
of religion generally claim that this possibility began to be exploited only 
in 1955, when Anthony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre edited New Essays 
in Philosophical Th eology.5 Th e implication is that the analytic philosophy 
of religion is an essentially Anglo-American development. If we consider 
analytic philosophy in general, it is obvious that no claim of a narrowly 
4 Th is possibility was already manifest in § 53 of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. 
5 Anthony Flew & Alisdair MacIntyre, eds., New Essays in Philosophical Th eology, 
(London: SCM Press), 1955. 
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Anglo-American pedigree can be taken seriously, for analytic philosophy 
is in no small part a Central European aff air (German, Austrian, Polish, 
Czechoslovakian), as many historical works show clearly.6 And as for 
the analytic philosophy of religion, its correctly named precursors were 
Jan Salamucha,7 Jan Drewnowski,8 Bolesław Sobociński,9 and Józef 
Bocheński, all members of the “Cracow Circle”;10 so it is historically false 
that its roots are Anglo-American.
Of course, the historical events at the end of the 1930’s in Poland 
were very unfavorable for the further development of this Polish analytic 
philosophy of religion and of philosophy in general. Jan Salamucha died 
heroically during the Warsaw uprising (1944); Father Bocheński fought 
with Polish troops against the Germans, especially in Italy (Monte 
Cassino). Aft er the war, Bocheński lived in Switzerland at the Dominican 
monastery of Fribourg (Albertinum), and taught philosophy (and 
6 See Michael Dummett, Origins of Analytical Philosophy, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). See also works by Peter Simons, Barry Smith, Kevin Mulligan, 
and, in French, by Jacques Bouveresse and Jean-Pierre Cometti, on the importance of 
Austrian (and Polish) philosophy in the development of analytic philosophy. 
7 Jan Salamucha, Wiedza i wiara, Wybrane pisma fi lozofi czne, Pod redakcja J. Jada-
ckiego i K. Swiętorzeckiej, (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Universytetu 
Lubelskiego, 1997); Knowledge and Faith, ed. by K. Swiętorzecka & J. Jadacki, (Amster-
dam: Rodopi, 2003). See R. Pouivet, “Faith, Reason, and Logic” in T. L. Smith, ed., Faith 
and Reason, (South Bend: St Augustine’s Press, 2001); and R. Pouivet, “Jan Salamucha’s 
Analytic Th omism” in S. Lapointe, J. Woleński, M. Marion, & W. Miśkiewicz, Th e Golden 
Age of Polish Philosophy, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009).
8 Jan Franciszek Drewnowski, Filozofi a i precyzja, (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe 
Katolickiego Universytetu Lubelskiego, 1996). (A former student of Kotarbiński.)
9 Sobociński was a professional logician. He was Leśniewski’s assistant, but he never 
published anything on the topic.
10 Bocheński’s paper, “Th e Cracow Circle”, in K. Szaniawski, ed., Th e Vienna Circle 
and the Lvov-Warsaw School, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989) provides historical information. 
One can also recommend a web site dedicated to the Cracow Circle: <http://segr-did2.
fmag.unict.it/~polphil/PolPhil/Cracow/Cracow.html>. In Entre la logique et la foi, 
Entretiens avec J. M. Bocheński (collected by J. Parys, tr. E. Morin-Aguilar), Bocheński 
claims that the members of the Cracow Circle were attacked (especially Salamucha) by 
the Polish Church, because they wanted to use the new logical instruments to discuss 
ancient scholastic arguments. “What would Saint Th omas have done today? He would 
have used mathematical logic, because it is the best, but that was exactly what the relics 
of ancient times rejected” (p. 22). Bocheński also refers to Father Clark in America and 
Father Bendiek in Germany, who also tried to use the new logical instruments to examine 
theological arguments. But they were completely isolated, he says. 
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Soviet studies) at the University of Fribourg, though he also sojourned 
frequently in the United States, especially at Notre Dame University.11 
Th e Medieval Model
Two main commitments were fundamental to the Cracow Circle. Th e 
fi rst of these was that the logical tools introduced into philosophy by 
Frege, Russell, and the Lvov-Warsaw School (Jan Łukasiewicz, Alfred 
Tarski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński)12 are the best instruments to apply to the 
study of traditional problems about God, especially in the analysis and 
assessment of the proofs of His existence. Th e second was the conviction 
that the traditional questions of metaphysics, natural theology, and 
philosophical theology are not meaningless—contrary to what was 
suggested by logical positivists of the Vienna Circle.13 Th ese two elements 
anticipated analytic philosophy of religion as it has developed from the 
1950’s to the present.
Th us, for example, Plantinga proposed a new analysis of Anselm’s 
ontological argument in terms of modal logic (by using the S5 system).14 
Th e Cracow Circle had the same sort of ambition: to examine and, 
eventually, to improve ancient arguments by using new logical methods. 
Th e logical instruments that were applied underwent a certain amount of 
evolution between the 1930’s and the 1970’s, but the project is essentially 
the same. Th e opposition of Polish philosophers to the positivist critique 
of metaphysics as meaningless15 also anticipates the renaissance of 
metaphysics in analytic philosophy (Alvin Plantinga, David Lewis, 
David Armstrong, Peter van Inwagen, etc.) and what may be called its 
“pre-Kantian attitude.”
Two historical remarks may help here to better appreciate the 
Cracow Circle’s project and to show how the Cracow Circle philosophers 
anticipated the later analytic philosophy of religion. 
11 Józef Bocheński, Wspomnienia, (Komorow: Wydawnictwo Antyk, 1994). 
12 Jan Woleński, Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1989); Roger Pouivet & Manuel Rebuschi, eds., La philosophie en Pologne 1918-1939, 
(Paris: Vrin, 2006). 
13 See Klemens Szaniawski, ed., Th e Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School, 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989). 
14 Alvin Plantinga, Th e Nature of Necessity, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), chap. X. 
15 See M. Przelecki, “Th e Approach to Metaphysics in the Lvov-Warsaw School” in K. 
Szanawski, ed., Th e Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989).
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1. Salamucha, who worked in part within the lineage of the medieval 
scholar Konstanty Michalski (a specialist of 14th-century nominalism),16 
and Bocheński, whose academic fi eld was the history of logic,17 thought 
that Scholastic philosophy provided a rationalistic model that was to be 
emulated in dealing with metaphysical problems. Th e Scholastic model 
focused on arguments and examined them through public, dialectical 
procedures. In other words, the model of philosophy is not that of the 
great modern systems (Descartes’ Meditations or Spinoza’s Ethics); nor 
is it that of the broad interpretative systems of German idealism (Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel) or the project of a global hermeneutics (as in 
Nietzsche and Heidegger). Th e model is rather constituted by the logical 
and technical discussions that we fi nd in the works of Aquinas, Duns 
Scotus and Ockham, and also in some less well-known philosophers and 
logicians of the Medieval period.
One could complain that Michalski and Bocheński somewhat 
misrepresented Medieval Philosophy, which cannot be completely 
identifi ed with the dialectical (or logical) period of the 13th and 14th 
centuries. But what is important to understanding their project is that they 
viewed a particular dialectical moment in the history of philosophy, re-
articulated in terms of new (Fregean and Russellian) logical instruments, 
as constituting a methodological model that informed the philosophy of 
religion of the Cracow Circle. And it is this same model of philosophy 
that has now generally been taken up by analytic philosophers of religion. 
It would not be an exaggeration to speak of a renewal of Scholasticism, 
which must however be clearly distinguished from Neo-scholasticism.
“Neo-scholasticism” is a broad appellation that covers diff erent 
trends. Its overarching project was to restore fundamental doctrines of 
Catholic thought. Neo-scholasticism has, alas, sometimes amounted 
to the pious and dogmatic rehearsal of the views of Aquinas, or, more 
properly, of the “Neo-scholastic Aquinas”: an ecclesial creation of the 
end of the 19th century. What was intellectually alive and searching in 
Aquinas, and what was an argumentative discourse between Aquinas 
and other philosophers, both from earlier times and from his own time, 
16 See Claude Pannacio, “Konstanty Michalski on Late Medieval Nominalism” in S. 
Lapointe, J. Woleński, M. Marion, & W. Miśkiewicz, Th e Golden Age of Polish Philosophy. 
17 His book in German, Formale Logik, was translated into English in 1961: A History 
of Formal Logic, (South Bend: Notre Dame University Press). 
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was transformed by Neo-scholasticism into an ideological system, the 
goal of which was to oppose Catholic thought to modern philosophy 
and to construct a refuge for believers against what was considered to be 
modern errors coming from the Enlightenment. 
2. Salamucha and Bocheński adopted a deliberately non-Neo-
scholastic attitude toward Medieval philosophy. As we noted, the Cracow 
Circle aimed to reconstruct Medieval arguments, especially proofs of the 
existence of God, using new logical tools, thereby to improve them, so 
that these arguments could be scrutinized philosophically in their best 
versions. Th e Cracow philosophers also wanted to renew discussion of 
certain basic concepts in metaphysics, for example the concepts of essence, 
abstraction, and the transcendental, by using the technical means provided 
by the new philosophy of logic. Th us, both the Cracow Circle and the 
current analytic philosophy of religion fi nd inspiration in a reconstructed 
history of Medieval philosophy. In both cases, it is through a reparsing 
into our own philosophical idiom that historical philosophical theories 
are understood. Th is approach rejects what we may call an “archeological 
attitude” and is meant to deliver us from anachronism.18 
Such are the reasons why it seems to me historically correct to claim 
that the analytic philosophy of religion began in Poland in the 1930’s, 
at a time when British and American analytic philosophers had not yet 
embarked upon any such project. One reason why Polish philosophers 
could pursue this project is that Polish “scientifi c” philosophers in general, 
and the Cracow Circle philosophers in particular, never suff ered from 
the “principle of verifi cation” syndrome or from any form of doctrinal 
empiricism. Th e idea that “scientifi c” thinking in philosophy requires 
one to adopt an empirical or naturalistic criterion of meaning was quite 
foreign to the Lvov-Warsaw school of philosophy.
Th e Principle of Verifi cation and the Critique of “Onomatoids”
To explain this point, I think it useful to refer to Kotarbiński’s very strong 
critique of “onomatoids” (apparent-terms or pseudo-terms).19 Th ese are 
18 See Roger Pouivet, Philosophie contemporaine, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2008), chap. II. 
19 See Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Gnosiology, Th e Scientifi c Approach to the Th eory of 
Knowledge, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966. Th is is the translation by O. Wojtasiewicz 
of the second edition of Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk 
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terms that appear to be concrete when in fact they are not. Not only “the 
golden mountain,” “the present King of France,” and “Madame Bovary’s 
grand-mother,” but also “the Unconscious,” “the invisible hand,” and 
”deconstruction,” are all onomatoids. Kotarbiński’s so-called “reism”20 
posits that terms such as “smoothness” and “relationship,” along with 
all names of properties or events, are onomatoids. Th e doctrine of 
onomatoids is, I think, part of an ethics of intellectual belief that is meant 
to make us aware of the risk, especially in the teaching of humanistic 
disciplines, of pseudo-terms.21 But note that Kotarbiński does not use 
this doctrine against metaphysics, and, especially, he does not say that 
“God” is an onomatoid. If God is a concrete entity, “God” is not at all 
a pseudo-term. 
Th e principle of verifi cation seemed to mandate the elimination of 
theology and all serious religious discourse. At best, such discourse is 
construed as fi ctional or poetic. But the critique of onomatoids does not 
have this consequence. Th is is the reason why an analytic philosophy 
of religion was possible already in the 1930’s, in a country where the 
notion of “onomatoids” was in use. But logical positivism, and the 
form of naturalism that replaced it, for example in Quine’s philosophy, 
made matters more diffi  cult in the English-speaking countries (where 
positivism was not really native but derived from the Vienna Circle and 
its followers). Of course, verifi cationism did not survive for very long. 
But it had strong consequences for the analytic mode of philosophizing 
even aft er it had been severely criticized and generally abandoned. 
Unburdened by the principle of verifi cation, the Cracow Circle 
philosophers had the space needed to become the genuine precursors of 
the analytic philosophy of religion. Later on, English-speaking analytic 
philosophers of religion followed the path of Polish philosophers of whose 
work they were unaware. Th is is why I fi nd strong reason to question the 
narrative according to which the philosophy of religion came late into 
(1929), an obligatory reading for the students of the University of Warsaw during the 
thirties. See also Peter Geach, “Names in Kotarbiński’s Elementy” in J. Wolenski, ed., 
Kotarbiński: Logic, Semantics, and Ontology, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990). 
20 Jan Woleński, “Reism”, Th e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reism/>.
21 See Roger Pouivet, “Kotarbiński et l’éthique intellectuelle”, in R. Pouivet & M. 
Rebuschi, eds., La philosophie en Pologne 1918-1939 (Paris: J. Vrin, 2006). 
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the analytic movement, in the 1950’s to be more precise. For what has 
since been called “Analytic Th omism” had already been introduced by 
Salamucha and Bocheński, before the Second World War;22 and it seems 
to me that this amounted to an initiation of the whole program that we 
now call the “analytic philosophy of religion.”
What happened in Polish philosophy aft er the Second World War? 
We fi nd Marxist-inspired works, epistemology and philosophy of science 
(or what Polish philosophers of the so-called “Poznan School” called 
“Methodology”), logical works (very technical even if quite inventive, 
for example the works of Roman Suszko; though such works were oft en 
detached from philosophical concerns), social and political philosophy, 
and the phenomenological school that Roman Ingarden initiated in 
Cracow.23 Th e philosophy of religion was pursued in Catholic universities, 
though mainly in Lublin24, with fi gures like Karol Wojtyła, the future 
John-Paul II. Th is was largely neo-scholastic philosophy, with infl uences 
from French philosophers like Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, Jean 
Nabert, Maurice Nédoncelle, and from the phenomenology inspired by 
Max Scheler; and its practitioners were more interested in “existentialism” 
than in analytic philosophy. 
And Bocheński? At the University of Friburg, in Switzerland, 
he created a department of Soviet studies and was one of the leading 
specialists of Communist thought, even acting as a consultant for Western 
governments in “Kremlinology.” But he also defended, in numerous 
books, a conception of philosophy inspired by the methodological ideals 
of the Lvov-Warsaw school. While Bocheński is better known for his 
22 For the notion of “Analytic Th omism”, see John Haldane, “Analytical Th omism: 
A Brief Introduction”, Monist, October 1997, vol. 80, Nr 4 (Analytical Th omism); see also 
Roger Pouivet, “Le thomisme analytique, à Cracovie et ailleurs”, Revue Internationale de 
Philosophique, n°3/2003 (Philosophie analytique de la religion). 
23 See Zbigniew A. Jordan, Philosophy and Ideology: Th e Development of Philosophy 
and Marxism-Leninism in Poland since the Second World War, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1963). 
24 See Mieczyslaw Krąpiec, Andrzej Maryniaczyk, Th e Lublin Philosophical School, 
(Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwina, Katedra Metafi zyki KUL, 2010). In 
the Lublin School, Jerzy Kalinowski is an interesting fi gure. From Lublin, he emigrated 
to France at the end of the 1950’s, and developed there—in the “golden age” of French 
Marxism and Structuralism—deontological logic and Th omistic metaphysics. See Jerzy 
Kalinowski, L’impossible métaphysique, (Paris: Beauchesne, 1981); Michel Bastit & Roger 
Pouivet, eds., Jerzy Kalinowski: Logique et Normativité, Philosophia Scientiae, vol. 10, 
cahier, 2006. 
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works in the history of logic, especially the logic of antiquity and the 
Middle Ages, he also wrote a Logic of Religion published in 1965, based 
upon lectures given at New York University in 1963. My question is: 
How is it possible for such a book to be published in the United States 
at that date, in English, and then to be virtually ignored by analytic 
philosophers of religion?25 Anthony Kenny edited Salamucha’s paper on 
the formalization of Aquinas’s proof ex motu in Aquinas, A Collection 
of Critical Essays.26 But, in general, the Polish roots of the analytic 
philosophy of religion, and its further development by Bocheński, have 
simply been ignored. Could it be that the narratives of the history of the 
analytic philosophy of religion suff er from parochialism? 
II. THE JUSTIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE
IN BOCHEŃSKI’S LOGIC OF RELIGION
Th e Analysis of Religious Discourse
Having reviewed the relevant history of the Cracow Circle and mentioned 
the decline, and inchoate resurrection, of Polish analytic philosophy of 
religion in the wake of the Second World War, I now turn to a somewhat 
more detailed account and analysis of Józef Bocheński’s justifi cation of 
religious discourse, as presented in his Logic of Religion. Th is will provide 
the reader with a better idea of the kind of work that derived, in the 
post-war period, from the Cracow Circle’s pre-war program concerning 
religious belief.
It is clear that the Logic of Religion may be understood in part as 
a development of the thinking of the Cracow Circle, although the case 
must not be overstated, and it is diffi  cult to say to what extent Bocheński 
himself thought of it in that way. One reason is that he includes neither 
quotations nor references in the book, and so no explicit connection is 
made to Salamucha or other members of the Cracow Circle although the 
infl uences may be justly inferred. Th e reason given by Bocheński for this 
25 Th e book was reviewed in the Philosophical Review vol. 76, Nr 4, 1967; but beyond 
that, it was hardly noticed by those writing in the fi eld.
26 A. Kenny, Aquinas : A Collection of Critical Essays, (South Bend: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1976). 
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omission of references is that Th e Logic of Religion is a “purely speculative 
book.”27 But many purely speculative books contain quotations and 
references. By “speculative,” Bocheński seems to mean that his account is 
a priori: not historical, empirical, or hermeneutical. Th is gives to the book 
a very special rhetorical aspect that is characteristic of the Lvov-Warsaw 
school,28 and in itself constitutes a good reason for thinking that the book 
continues the Cracow Circle’s program in philosophy of religion. 
Th e book could also be said not to be about religion, but about 
religious discourse. And it is surely one of the main methodological 
aspects of the Lvov-Warsaw school and (consequently) of the Cracow 
circle, that the analysis of language is considered the proper medium 
by which to approach many domains in philosophy. We may note that 
Bocheński is a realist (as were the Polish philosophers of the Lvov-
Warsaw school generally). He says, “when a logician states that, if no 
A is B, then no B is A, he is not talking about the rules of reasoning but, 
at least primarily, he is establishing a necessary connection between two 
states of things.”29 Th us, to be about religious discourse is not to be about 
discourse alone. Even less is it to suggest that religious matters are simply 
linguistic matters, or that religion is a language game with no matters of 
fact or realities to be considered. 
Bocheński endeavors, fi rst, to prove that general logic can be applied 
to religious discourse (Chapter II, “Religion and Logic”); secondly, 
to describe the formal structure of religious discourse and the logical 
relations between religious and profane discourses (Chapter III, “Th e 
Structure of Religious Discourse”); and thirdly, to discuss certain 
fundamental problems concerning the meaning and justifi cation of 
religious discourse (Chapter IV, “Meaning in Religious Discourse,” and 
Chapter V, “Justifi cation of Religious Discourse.”)30 I will here briefl y 
discuss the part of the book that concerns the justifi cation of religious 
discourse. Th e reason is that a central part of the analytic philosophy 
27 Joseph M. Bochenski, Th e Logic of Religion, (New York: New York University Press, 
1965), p. VII. 
28 Today, the followers of the Lvov-Warsaw school still employ this rhetoric (perhaps 
one could even say aesthethics) of axiomatics in philosophy. 
29 J. M. Bochenski, Th e Logic of Religion, p. 4. 
30 Th is the way the program of the book is described by W. Rowe in his review of the 
book (Philosophical Review, vol. 76, Nr 4, 1967). 
13POLISH ANALY TIC PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
of religion has been devoted, at least until recently, to this problem of 
justifi cation. It is thus especially interesting to compare Bocheński’s 
account with what contemporary writers call the “epistemology of 
religious beliefs.” 
Th e Question of Justifi cation
What Bocheński proposes are distinctions which, in the end, yield 
a classifi cation of the diff erent theories of justifi cation. Justifi cation 
can be direct or indirect. In the former case, justifi cation is “an act of 
(sensuous or non sensuous) insight; the object must always be present.”31 
If the justifi cation is indirect, “it consists of a reasoning; the object is 
not present.”32 Indirect justifi cation is deductive or reductive; and here 
Bocheński borrows a distinction from Łukasiewicz (and Jevons, according 
to Łukasiewicz). Here is Bocheński’s explanation of the distinction: 
Every reasoning has as one premise a conditional, or a sentence which can be 
easily transformed into a conditional. As the premise we use, in deduction, 
a sentence of the same shape as the antecedent of that conditional and obtain 
as conclusion a sentence of the shape of its consequent. In reduction we 
have as a second premise a sentence of the shape of the consequent, and we 
obtain as conclusion a sentence of the shape of the antecedent of the fi rst 
premise.33
Th is means that the reductive reasoning can be either inductive or 
abductive. 
If the premises are taken from basic dogma, the question becomes 
that of knowing how the dogma is itself justifi ed. Th e basic dogma is 
“a meta-logical rule, according to which every element of objective faith . . .
has to be accepted as true.”34 Th en, two questions may be asked: 
 (A) Is it possible to justify the basic dogma? 
 (B) And if it is, what is the diff erence between a justifi cation in the 
religious discourse and in the profane discourse? 
31 J. M. Bochenski, Th e Logic of Religion, p. 118. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., p. 120. 
34 Ibid., p. 61. 
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Th ese problems are considered by Bocheński to be “problems of applied 
logic, and therefore . . . we are trying to carry out logical analysis of 
a material which is empirically given.”35 Logic is here applied to a certain 
extra-logical fi eld. But this can be done in two diff erent ways. (1) One 
can add some extra-logical terms, axioms and rules to certain portions 
of formal logic. “In this sense, for example, contemporary physics or any 
sort of theology is applied logic,”36 Bocheński says. (2) But in the “proper 
use of the term . . . we may mean by ‘applied logic’ the study of those 
logical laws and rules . . . which are used in a given fi eld.”37 Very oft en, 
such special parts of logic must be developed ad hoc, according to the 
use that is made of them in the fi eld in question.38 Bocheński defi nes 
a theorem:
For all f: if f is a fi eld of human activity, then there is applied logic of f if 
and only if f includes discourse which embodies or expresses some objective 
structures.39
It seems to me that what we would today call the “epistemology of 
religious beliefs” is what Bocheński considers to be the applied logic of 
religious discourse. Logic has historically been developed for the sake 
of science and therefore limited to propositions, whether logical or 
factual. But that limitation is not a necessity. For example, during the 
20th century, a formal logic of morals was developed in which most 
formulae represent not indicative sentences but imperative ones. And 
performative sentences have also been shown to be appropriate objects of 
formal logical study. Logic cannot be applied “where there is no discourse 
at all” or “where discourse is present, but does not embody or express 
an objective structure.”40 Th is is the case if a discourse is completely 
meaningless or if it expresses only subjective states (although even in this 
35 Ibid., p. 125. 
36 Ibid., p. 6. 
37 Ibid. 
38 I think that this diff erence is important: a large part of what has been done in 
logical studies under the name of “non classical logic” is in fact what Bocheński calls 
“applied logic”, i.e. an ad hoc logic made to formalize the way we reason in a given fi eld 
rather than a formal logic independent of any given fi eld.
39 J. M. Bochenski, Th e Logic of Religion, p. 7. 
40 Ibid., p. 8. 
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last case a semantics is possible, but this semantics cannot be formal). 
And it is also only if a discourse expresses not only objective structures 
but propositions that a methodology is possible, “for methodology 
is essentially a theory of truth-conditions, and only propositions are 
true.”41
An Epistemological Inquiry
According to Bocheński, the condition for framing an “applied logic” 
(and thus an epistemology of religious belief, if I am right in thinking 
that these are the same) is a propositional account of religious belief. 
A negative answer to the question whether it is possible to justify basic 
dogma (question (A), above) seems to entail a non-propositional account 
of religious belief, because it forbids the application of logic to religious 
discourse. In connection with the justifi cation of basic dogma, Bocheński 
speaks about “the blind-leap theory,” that is, a theory of justifi cation of 
religious discourse that describes faith as belief in virtue of absurdity: Credo 
quia absurdum, as Tertullian said. I suppose that Bocheński has in mind 
something like Kierkegaard’s account. At any rate, the notion of a “blind 
leap” seems to be Kierkegaardian. Th is non-propositional account of 
religious belief is also akin to Wittgenstein’s theory of religious discourse 
in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and even more to the account of 
religious commitment given in his lectures on religious belief. Bocheński 
is quite critical of the blind-leap theory. For him, vast parts of religious 
discourse are not intended to be understood as propositional, but “some 
parts of the religious discourse of every religion are intended by their 
users to express and assert propositions.”42 Th is means that Bocheński 
rejects a purely phenomenological account of religious belief. If belief 
were completely indiff erent to the truth of propositions composing 
the Creed, for example, that would constitute a deep modifi cation of 
the nature of religious belief as traditionally understood. It seems to 
me that it would mean, above all, that religious “belief ” would consist 
only in a certain sort of experience and an attitude of faith without any 
propositional content. In that case, religion would lie beyond the limits of 
logic and of epistemology. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., p. 41. 
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On the other hand, for Bocheński, if there is positive answer to the 
question (A), then that answer may be either “complete” or “incomplete.”43 
“Complete” does not mean that the believer purports to have full certainty, 
“comparable with that of direct insight or of convincing deductive proof.”44 
It means rather that the acceptance of the basic dogma is determined 
solely and entirely by a rational justifi cation. “Incomplete” means that 
the act of faith is decisive. And by faith, one means something (a) distinct 
from science (there is no “proof ”), (b) free (there is no compelling reason 
to accept it) and freely chosen (a matter of will), and (c) certain (but in 
a diff erent way from that which is scientifi cally certain). “Faith is said 
to be produced by the human will with the help of divine grace, or by 
illumination by Buddha, and so on,”45 Bocheński says.
Th us, a theory of complete (if not deductive or intuitively direct) 
justifi cation of religious discourse is a rationalistic theory. Th e premises 
used in such a case can be factual (strictly rationalistic theory) or can be 
sentences expressing accepted moral and esthetic propositions (broadly 
rationalistic theory). Th e fi rst case corresponds, it seems to me, to 
natural theology, and the second case corresponds to moral arguments 
within the epistemology of religious belief. Bocheński himself rejects 
a strictly rationalistic theory: religious discourse and profane discourse 
would thereby be confused. According to him, logic of religion seems 
to show that the project of natural theology, except perhaps as a part 
of a justifi catory process,46 is an impossible one. But more broadly, the 
project of a complete justifi cation is criticized. Th e (free) act of faith 
seems to be indispensable.
An incomplete justifi cation can be direct or indirect. Bocheński 
does not say a lot about the diff erence. He seems to mean that a direct 
justifi cation is not built upon deductive or reductive reasoning. Two 
43 Ibid., p. 127.
44 Ibid., p. 131.
45 Ibid., p. 135. In this sense, the Logic of Religion is not so far from what Cardinal 
Newman called a Grammar of Assent, even if Newman’s project stresses the psychological 
aspects (at least in the sense of a philosophical psychology) of this justifi catory process, 
and Bocheński’s its logical aspects. For a recent account that deals historically and 
theoretically with similar questions (the relation between the motives of credibility and 
the act of faith), see the remarkable book by John T. Lamont, Divine Faith, (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2004).
46 However, Bocheński says nothing about this possibility.
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theories of incomplete direct justifi cation are discussed: the supernatural 
“insight theory” and the “trust theory.” Bocheński claims that the former 
“has never been seriously defended and does not merit consideration,” 
which I fi nd strange. For the French philosopher and theologian, Arnaud, 
so infl uenced by Augustine (and Descartes), says in the Logique de Port-
Royal: “Just as no other marks are needed to distinguish light from 
darkness except the light itself which makes itself sensed suffi  ciently, so 
no marks are necessary to recognize the truth but the very brightness 
which surrounds it and to which the mind submits, persuading it in 
spite of itself.”47 One might also say that, in a sense, Plantinga’s Calvinist-
inspired notion of sensus divinatis corresponds in part to the insight 
theory. Th e proper function of the sensus divinitatis and the operation 
of the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit are presented by Plantinga 
in terms of an immediate (i.e., non-inferential) awareness of the truth of 
theistic, and specifi cally Christian, belief. But Bocheński considers that 
insight can be used only to justify a necessary sentence, and sentences 
belonging to the basic dogma are not necessary. “Such sentences 
cannot be justifi ed by direct insight, not even in part,”48 he maintains. If 
Plantinga’s account corresponds even partly to what Bocheński calls the 
insight theory, it would mean that someone has recently defended this 
theory that Bocheński thought had never been defended by anyone.
In connection with the “trust theory,” Bocheński criticizes the case 
where the basic dogma is justifi ed by direct trust in Revealing agency, 
exactly as a child believes its mother when she says that there is a city 
called “New York.” Bocheński defends what one calls today a reductionist 
theory of testimony, like Hume’s, according to which testimony is credible 
only because, and to the extent that, one has independent reasons for 
accepting whatever testimony led to its formation. But Bocheński defends 
this position only in the case of religious trust. For, in religious trust, we 
are not exactly in the same situation as the child and its mother. “You can 
trust only a person whom you know to exist,”49 Bocheński says, and so 
you need prior confi rmation that God exists in order to have confi dence 
in the truth of what He says. And you even need prior confi rmation that 
47 Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logic, or the Art of Th inking, tr. and ed. J.V. 
Buroker, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 8.
48 J. M. Bochenski, Th e Logic of Religion, p. 128.
49 Ibid., p. 137.
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God is speaking. Th e child, by contrast, knows directly of the existence of 
its mother and also knows that it is she who speaks. So the “trust theory” 
does not fi nd strong support according to Bocheński. 
An indirect theory of justifi cation can be deductivist. “Radical” 
deductivism purports to establish, by deductive means, the certainty 
of religious discourse to a greater degree than can attach to any other 
knowledge. A more “moderate” deductivism “admits that there is, in 
religious discourse, an element that is not demonstrable: but whatever 
is demonstrable in religious discourse is demonstrable by deductive 
proof.”50 Th e main objection by Bocheński against deductivism is “that 
no historical sentence can be demonstrated by deduction.”51 But if 
one means to prove, from a proof of the existence of God, the truth of 
propositions contained in a Creed, then one must establish historical 
sentences deductively; and this is impossible, according to Bocheński. 
Th e Negative Results of Bocheński’s Epistemology of Religious Belief
Two other indirect theories of justifi cation exist, both reductive, and 
thus both applying only inductive rules. Consequently, they cannot yield 
certainty. “As a result, what has been said above about the incompleteness 
of every justifi cation of the basic dogma is confi rmed,”52 says Bocheński. In 
one kind of reductive theory, the basic dogma is supported by authority; 
not the authority of the Revealing agent, however, but a human authority. 
Acceptance of the latter may come through insight into the person of the 
authority itself, as when a child accepts the word of its mother, although 
more oft en there is a reasoning process that conduces to the acceptance of 
such an authority. Th e incomplete and reductive theory is “the religious 
hypothesis.” According to Bocheński, “Th is theory has been voiced many 
times by diff erent theologians, mostly under misleading titles such as 
‘pragmatic justifi cation’.”53 Th e basic dogma is constructed by the believer, 
prior to the act of faith itself, in the form of an explanatory sentence. Th is 
is the religious hypothesis, and it serves to explain his experience. Th is 
is close to a reductive argument, and, I think, amounts to what we now 
50 Ibid., p. 140.
51 Ibid., p. 141. 
52 Ibid., p. 141. 
53 Ibid., p. 148. 
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call “an inference to the best explanation.” But Bocheński thinks that 
in the case of a religious hypothesis, the experiential sentences which 
form the starting point of the inference have very broad content, even 
encompassing a person’s “total experience.” Th e diff erence between this 
and the method of hypotheses in the sciences is that sentences concerning 
moral and esthetic values are included. Th e religious hypothesis has the 
advantage of giving a meaning to the world and to existence, as some 
writers might express it, or playing “the role of an axiom out of which the 
remainder is thought to be deduced,”54 as Bocheński says. He also notes 
two “curious phenomena” concerning the religious hypothesis model: 
“the diffi  culty of persuading another man of his truth” (for we do not 
have the same total experience) and “the diffi  culty of overthrowing [such 
an hypothesis] by falsifi cation”55 (due especially to its breadth). 
Finally the situation of the justifi cation of religious discourse, and 
belief, seems to be logically and epistemologically bad, in Bocheński’s 
view. We have many theories: the rationalistic theory, the trust theory, 
the deductivist theory, the authority theory, the theory of the religious 
hypothesis. But none of them seems easily defensible, or even defensible 
with diffi  culties. Ultimately, Bocheński is not prepared to say that religious 
discourse is logically warranted or justifi ed. At least, the justifi cation 
of religious discourse, as contrasted with justifi cation within religious 
discourse, is not at all convincing. But for Bocheński what matters for the 
philosophy of religion (as contrasted with apologetics) is the mapping 
of the theories and their epistemology, and not the conclusion that 
religious beliefs are ultimately warranted or justifi ed. Clearly, for Father 
Bocheński, they are not!
CONCLUSION
If what I said in this paper is right, then the analytic philosophy of religion 
is a Polish initiative. In the fi rst place, this claim helps to rectify an image 
of Polish philosophy of religion as mainly a mélange of Neo-Th omism 
and phenomenology, as illustrated, for example, in the philosophical 
54 Ibid., p. 149. 
55 Ibid., pp. 149-50. 
20 RO GER POUIVET
and theological works of John Paul II. Secondly, this claim shows also 
that some recent papers56 present an inaccurate, or at least incomplete, 
narrative about the analytic philosophy of religion, and the present 
article may serve to correct some historical mistakes. Th irdly, just as 
some works in the history of analytic philosophy have had the result of 
happily bringing this philosophy back to Central Europe, where it was so 
important before the Second World War, I hope that the rediscovery of 
the Cracow Circle may encourage, for the analytic philosophy of religion, 
the same sort of return to its home ground. Finally, a re-examination and 
appreciation of Polish work—not least Bocheński’s Logic of Religion—will 
show that mainstream analytic philosophy of religion has yet to meet 
challenges heretofore overlooked. Th e very systematic way Bocheński 
examines the possible ways of analyzing the question of the justifi cation 
of religious belief shows that these are not so numerous. His method 
is “logical,” systematic, and a priori. In the end, Bocheński’s conclusion 
concerning the justifi cation of religious belief is skeptical. Th ose who 
wish to claim that justifi cation is somehow possible must show that there 
are possibilities that do not fall into one of Bocheński’s categories, or that 
the distinctions he proposed were not the right ones.
56 See note 1. 
